Abstract. Managing uncertainty and/or vagueness is starting to play an important role in Semantic Web representation languages. Our aim is to overview basic concepts on representing uncertain and vague knowledge in current Semantic Web ontology and rule languages (and their combination).
Introduction
The management of uncertainty and/or vagueness is an important issue whenever the real world information to be represented is of imperfect nature, which likely occurs in Semantic Web tasks. In this work we overview the relevant work in the context of Description Logics [6] , Logic Programs [141] and their combination. This work should act as a reference/citation guide to the relevant literature, and, thus, we keep the formal level to a minimum.
Uncertainty and Vagueness Basics
There has been a long-lasting misunderstanding in the literature of artificial intelligence and uncertainty modelling, regarding the role of probability/possibility theory and vague/fuzzy theory. A clarifying paper is [63] . We recall here salient notes, which may clarify the role of these theories for the inexpert reader.
A standard example that points out the difference between degrees of uncertainty and degrees of truth is that of a bottle [63] . In terms of binary truth values, a bottle is viewed as full or empty. But if one accounts for the quantity of liquid in the bottle, one may e.g. say that the bottle is "half-full". Under this way of speaking, "full" becomes a fuzzy predicate [287] and the degree of truth of "the bottle is full" reflects the amount of liquid in the bottle. The situation is quite different when expressing our ignorance about whether the bottle is either full or empty (given that we know that only one of the two situations is the true one). Saying that the probability that the bottle is full is 0.5 does not mean that the bottle is half full.
We recall that under uncertainty theory fall all those approaches in which statements rather than being either true or false, are true or false to some probability or possibility (for example, "it will rain tomorrow"). That is, a statement is true or false in any world, but we are "uncertain" about which world to consider as the right one, and thus we speak about e.g. a probability distribution or a possibility distribution over the worlds. For example, we cannot exactly establish whether it will rain tomorrow or not, due to our incomplete knowledge about our world, but we can estimate to which degree this is probable, possible, and necessary.
As for the main differences between probability and possibility theory, the probability of an event is the sum of the probabilities of all worlds that satisfy this event, whereas the possibility of an event is the maximum of the possibilities of all worlds that satisfy the event. Intuitively, the probability of an event aggregates the probabilities of all worlds that satisfy this event, whereas the possibility of an event is simply the possibility of the "most optimistic" world that satisfies the event. Hence, although both probability and possibility theory allow for quantifying degrees of uncertainty, they are conceptually quite different from each other. That is, probability and possibility theory represent different facets of uncertainty.
On the other hand, under vagueness/fuzziness theory fall all those approaches in which statements (for example, "the tomato is ripe") are true to some degree, which is taken from a truth space. That is, an interpretation maps a statement to a truth degree, since we are unable to establish whether a statement is completely true or false due to the involvement of vague concepts, such as "ripe", which only have an imprecise definition. For example, we cannot exactly say whether a tomato is ripe or not, but rather can only say that the tomato is ripe to some degree. Usually, such statements involve so-called vague/fuzzy predicates [287] .
Note that all vague/fuzzy statements are truth-functional, that is, the degree of truth of every statement can be calculated from the degrees of truth of its constituents, while uncertain statements cannot be a function of the uncertainties of their constituents [62] . More concretely, in probability theory, only negation is truth-functional (see Eq. 1), while in possibility theory, only disjunction resp. conjunction is truth-functional in possibilities resp. necessities of events (see Eq. 4). Furthermore, mathematical fuzzy logics are based on truly many-valued logical operators, while uncertainty logics are defined on top of standard binary logical operators.
In the following, we illustrate a typical formalization of uncertain statements and vague statements. In the former case, we consider a basic probabilistic/possibilistic logic, while in the latter, we consider a basic many-valued logic.
Probabilistic Logic
Probabilistic logic has its origin in philosophy and logic. Its roots can be traced back to Boole in 1854 [17] . There is a wide spectrum of formal languages that have been explored in probabilistic logic, ranging from constraints for unconditional and conditional events to rich languages that specify linear inequalities over events (see especially the work by Nilsson [207] , Fagin et al. [74] , Dubois and Prade et al. [5, 60, 64, 65] , Frisch and Haddawy [81] , and the first author [154, 157, 161] ; see also the survey on sentential probability logic by Hailperin [94] ). Recently, nonmonotonic generalizations of probabilistic logic have been developed and explored; see especially [165] for an overview. In this section, for illustrative purposes, we recall only the simple probabilistic logic described in [207] .
We first define probabilistic formulas and probabilistic knowledge bases. We assume a set of basic events Φ = {p 1 , . . . , p n } with n 1. We use ⊥ and to denote false and true, respectively. We define events by induction as follows. Every element of Φ ∪ {⊥, } is an event. If φ and ψ are events, then also ¬φ, (φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∨ ψ), and (φ → ψ) are events. We use (φ ↔ ψ) as a shortcut for (φ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ). We adopt the usual conventions to eliminate parentheses. A probabilistic formula is an expression of the form φ l, where φ is an event, and l is a real number from the unit interval [0, 1]. Informally, φ l says that φ is true with a probability of at least l. For example, rain tomorrow 0.7 may express that it will rain tomorrow with a probability of at least 0.7. Notice also that ¬φ 1 − u encodes that φ is true with a probability of at most u. Also, we use φ = l as a shortcut for having both φ l and ¬φ 1 − l. A probabilistic knowledge base KB is a finite set of probabilistic formulas.
We next define worlds and probabilistic interpretations. A world I associates with every basic event in Φ a binary truth value. We extend I by induction to all events as usual. We denote by I Φ the (finite) set of all worlds for Φ. A world I satisfies an event φ, or I is a model of φ, denoted I |= φ, iff I(φ) = true. A probabilistic interpretation Pr is a probability function on I Φ (that is, a mapping Pr : I Φ → [0, 1] such that all Pr (I) with I ∈ I Φ sum up to 1). Intuitively, Pr (I) is the degree to which the world I ∈ I Φ is probable, that is, the probability function Pr encodes our "uncertainty" about which world is the right one. The probability of an event φ in Pr , denoted Pr (φ), is the sum of all Pr (I) such that I ∈ I Φ and I |= φ. The following equations are an immediate consequence of the above definitions: for all probabilistic interpretations Pr and events φ and ψ, the following relationships hold:
Pr (φ ∧ ψ) = Pr (φ) + Pr (ψ) − Pr (φ ∨ ψ) ; Pr (φ ∧ ψ) min(Pr (φ), Pr (ψ)) ; Pr (φ ∧ ψ) max(0, Pr (φ) + Pr (ψ) − 1) ; Pr (φ ∨ ψ) = Pr (φ) + Pr (ψ) − Pr (φ ∧ ψ) ; Pr (φ ∨ ψ) min(1, Pr (φ) + Pr (ψ)) ; Pr (φ ∨ ψ) max(Pr (φ), Pr (ψ)) ; Pr (¬φ) = 1− Pr (φ) ; Pr (⊥) =0; Pr ( ) =1.
(
A probabilistic interpretation Pr satisfies a probabilistic formula φ l, or Pr is a model of φ l, denoted Pr |= φ l, iff Pr (φ) l. We say Pr satisfies a probabilistic knowledge base KB , or Pr is a model of KB , iff Pr satisfies all F ∈ KB . We say KB is satisfiable iff a model of KB exists. A probabilistic formula F is a logical consequence of KB , denoted KB |= F , iff every model of KB satisfies F . We say φ l is a tight logical consequence of KB iff l is the infimum of Pr (φ) subject to all models Pr of KB . Notice that the latter is equivalent to l = sup {r | KB |= φ r}. Note that often also conditional events of the form φ | ψ are allowed, which may then be used in conditional probabilistic formulae of the form φ | ψ l, where φ and ψ are events. These statements intuitively encode that the conditional probability of φ given ψ is equal or greater than l. For instance, f lies | bird 0.8 dictates that at least 80% of birds fly. From a semantics point of view, we define
and, thus,
The main decision and optimization problems in probabilistic logic are deciding the satisfiability of probabilistic knowledge bases and logical consequences from probabilistic knowledge bases, as well as computing tight logical consequences from probabilistic knowledge bases, which can be done by deciding the solvability of a system of linear inequalities and by solving a linear optimization problem, respectively. In particular, column generation techniques from operations research have been successfully used to solve large problem instances in probabilistic logic; see especially the work by Jaumard et al. [114] and Hansen et al. [98] .
Bayesian Network. We recall here also some basics of Bayesian Networks (BN), as they play an important role in many probabilistic logic formalisms in the sense that BNs can be expressed in these logics (see, e.g. [29, 125, 215, 285] ).
A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph whose nodes represent random variables, and whose arcs encode conditional independencies between the variables. If there is an arc from node b to another node a, b is called a parent of a, and a is a child of b. The set of parent nodes of a node a i is denoted by parents(a i ). If nodes b 1 , . . . , b n are parents of a node a, then we have an associated conditional probability table Pr (a | b 1 , . . . , b n ). If node a i has no parents, its local probability distribution is said to be unconditional, otherwise it is conditional. If the value of a node is observed, then the node is said to be an evidence node. It is required that the joint distribution of the node values can be written as the product of the local distributions of each node and its parents: that is, We may also encode a BN in a probabilistic propositional logic using conditional events, as shown in the following example.
Example 2.1. Suppose that there are two events, which could cause grass to be wet: either the sprinkler is on or it's raining. Also, suppose that the rain has a direct effect on the use of the sprinkler (namely that when it rains, the sprinkler is usually not turned on). Then the situation can be modelled with a Bayesian network, as shown in Fig. 1 . All three variables (Rain, Sprinkler and GrassWet ) have two possible values T (for true) and F (for false). Rain has an unconditional probability distribution: Pr (Rain = T ) = 0.2, while Pr (Rain = F ) = 0.8. The conditional probability table associated to the node Sprinkler provides the conditional probabilities Pr (Sprinkler = X | Rain = Y ) for any X, Y ∈ {T, F }, while the conditional probability table associated to the node GrassWet provides the conditional probabilities
The joint probability function is:
The model can answer questions like "What is the probability that it is raining, given the grass is wet?" using Eq. 3:
We may encode the BN in a probabilistic propositional logic using conditional events. Indeed, for every node a, we use a propositional letters a(T ), a(F ), where the former encodes the event "a is true" and the latter encodes the event "a is false". Of course, we have to consider also (a(T ) ↔ ¬a(F )) = 1. If a node a has no parents then we can easily encode its associated probability table with the formula a(T ) = p. Hence, we have the formula Rain(T ) = 0.2. If a node has parents, we encode its associated conditional probability table using conditional probability formulae. In particular, we will have the conditional probabilistic formulae
Possibilistic Logic
We next recall possibilistic logic; see especially [59] . The main syntactic and semantic differences to probabilistic logic can be summarized as follows. Syntactically, rather than using probabilistic formulas to constrain the probabilities of propositional events, we now use possibilistic formulas to constrain the necessities and possibilities of propositional events. Semantically, rather than having probability distributions on worlds, each of which associates with every event a unique probability, we now have possibility distributions on worlds, each of which associates with every event a unique possibility and a unique necessity. Differently from the probability of an event, which is the sum of the probabilities of all worlds that satisfy that event, the possibility of an event is the maximum of the possibilities of all worlds that satisfy the event. As a consequence, probabilities and possibilities of events behave quite differently from each other (see Eqs. 1 and 4). These fundamental semantic differences between probabilities and possibilities can also be used as the main criteria for using either probabilistic logic or possibilistic logic in a given application involving uncertainty. In addition, possibilistic logic may especially be used for encoding user preferences, since possibility measures can actually be viewed as rankings (on worlds or also objects) along an ordinal scale.
The semantic differences between probabilities and possibilities are also reflected in the computational properties of possibilistic and probabilistic logic, since reasoning in probabilistic logic generally requires to solve linear optimization problems, while reasoning in possibilistic logic does not, and thus can generally be done with less computational effort. Note that although possibility measures can be viewed as sets of upper probability measures [61] , and possibility and probability measures can be translated into each other [56] , no translations are known between possibilistic and probabilistic knowledge bases as described here.
We first define possibilistic formulas and knowledge bases. Possibilistic formulas have the form P φ l or N φ l, where φ is an event, and l is a real number from [0, 1]. Informally, such formulas encode to what extent φ is possibly resp. necessarily true. For example, P rain tomorrow 0.7 encodes that it will rain tomorrow is possible to degree 0.7, while N father → man 1 says that a father is necessarily a man. A possibilistic knowledge base KB is a finite set of possibilistic formulas.
A possibilistic interpretation is a mapping π :
Intuitively, π(I) is the degree to which the world I is possible. In particular, every world I such that π(I) = 0 is impossible, while every world I such that π(I) = 1 is totally possible. We say π is normalized iff π(I) = 1 for some I ∈ I Φ . Intuitively, this guarantees that there exists at least one world, which could be considered as the real one.
The possibility of an event φ in a possibilistic interpretation π, denoted P oss(φ), is then defined by P oss(φ) = max {π(I) | I ∈ I Φ , I |= φ} (where max ∅ = 0). Intuitively, the possibility of φ is evaluated in the most possible world where φ is true. The dual notion to the possibility of an event φ is the necessity of φ, denoted N ec(φ), which is defined by N ec(φ) = 1 − P oss(¬φ). It reflects the lack of possibility of ¬φ, that is, N ec(φ) evaluates to what extent φ is certainly true. The following properties follows immediately from the above definitions.
For all possibilistic interpretations π and events φ and ψ, the following relationships hold:
P oss(φ ∧ ψ) min(P oss(φ), P oss(ψ)) ; P oss(φ ∨ ψ) = max(P oss(φ), P oss(ψ)) ; P oss(¬φ) = 1− N ec(φ) ; P oss(⊥) =0; P oss( ) =1 (in the normalized case);
A possibilistic interpretation π satisfies a possibilistic formula P φ l (resp.,
The notions of satisfiability, logical consequence, and tight logical consequence for possibilistic knowledge bases are then defined as usual (in the same way as in the probabilistic case). We refer the reader to [59, 107] for algorithms for possibilistic logic.
Many-Valued Logics
In the setting of many-valued logics, the convention prescribing that a proposition is either true or false is changed. A more refined range is used for the function that represents the meaning of a proposition. This is usual in natural language when words are modelled by fuzzy sets. For example, the compatibility of "tall" in the phrase "a tall man" with some individual of a given height is often graded: The man can be judged not quite tall, somewhat tall, rather tall, very tall, etc. Changing the usual true/false convention leads to a new concept of proposition, whose compatibility with a given state of facts is a matter of degree and can be measured on an ordered scale S that is no longer {0, 1}, but e.g. the unit interval [0, 1] . This leads to identifying a "fuzzy proposition" φ with a fuzzy set of possible states of affairs; the degree of membership of a state of affairs to this fuzzy set evaluates the degree of fit between the proposition and the state of facts it refers to. This degree of fit is called degree of truth of the proposition φ in the interpretation I (state of affairs). Many-valued logics provide compositional calculi of degrees of truth, including degrees between "true" and "false". A sentence is now not true or false only, but may have a truth degree taken from a truth space S, usually [0, 1] (in that case we speak bout Mathematical Fuzzy Logic [95] 
n n } for an integer n 1. Often S may be also a complete lattice or a bilattice [85, 79] (often used in logic programming [80] ). In the sequel, we assume S = [0, 1].
In the many-valued logic that we consider here, many-valued formulas have the form φ l or φ u, where l, u ∈ [0, 1] [93, 95] , which encode that the degree of truth of φ is at least l resp. at most u. For example, ripe tomato 0.9 says that we have a rather ripe tomato (the degree of truth of ripe tomato is at least 0.9).
Semantically, a many-valued interpretation I maps each basic proposition p i into [0, 1] and is then extended inductively to all propositions as follows:
where ⊗, ⊕, ⇒, and are so-called combination functions, namely, triangular norms (or t-norms), triangular co-norms (or s-norms), implication functions, and negation functions, respectively, which extend the classical Boolean conjunction, disjunction, implication, and negation, respectively, to the many-valued case. Several t-norms, s-norms, implication functions, and negation functions have been given in the literature. An important aspect of such functions is that they satisfy some properties that one expects to hold for the connectives; see Tables 1 and 2 . Note that in Table 1 , the two properties Tautology and Contradiction follow from Identity, Commutativity, and Monotonicity. Usually, the implication function ⇒ is defined as
Some t-norms, s-norms, implication functions, and negation functions of various fuzzy logics are shown in Table 3 [95] . In fuzzy logic, one usually distinguishes three different logics, namely, Łukasiewicz, Gödel, and Product logic; the popular Zadeh logic is a sublogic of Łukasiewicz logic. Some salient properties of these logics are shown in Table 4 . For more properties, see especially [95, 209] . Note also, that a manyvalued logic having all properties shown in Table 4 , collapses to boolean logic, that is the truth-set can be {0, 1} only.
The implication x ⇒ y = max(1 − x, y) is called Kleene-Dienes implication in the fuzzy logic literature. Note that we have the following inferences: Let a n and a ⇒ b m. Then, under Kleene-Dienes implication, we infer that if n > 1 − m then b m. Under r-implication relative to a t-norm ⊗, we infer that b n ⊗ m.
Note that implication functions and t-norms are also used to define the degree of subsumption between fuzzy sets and the composition of two (binary) fuzzy relations. A fuzzy set R over a countable crisp set X is a function R : 
A many-valued interpretation I satisfies a many-valued formula φ l (resp., φ u) or I is a model of φ l (resp., φ u), denoted I |= φ l (resp., I |= φ u), iff I(φ) l (resp., I(φ) u). The notions of satisfiability, logical consequence, and tight logical consequence for many-valued knowledge bases are then defined in the standard way (in the same way as in the probabilistic case). We refer the reader to [92, 93, 95] for algorithms for many-valued logics. Table 3 . Combination functions of various fuzzy logics 
3 Managing Imperfect Knowledge in Semantic Web Languages
The Case of Description Logics
Probabilistic Uncertainty and Description Logics. Although there are several previous approaches to probabilistic description logics without semantic web background, P-SHOIN (D) [86, 167, 171] (see also [175] ) is the most expressive probabilistic description logic, both in terms of the generalized classical description logic and in terms of the supported forms of terminological and assertional probabilistic knowledge. The syntax of the probabilistic description logic P-SHOIN (D) uses the notion of a conditional constraint from [157] to express probabilistic knowledge in addition to the axioms of SHOIN (D). Its semantics is based on the notion of lexicographic entailment in probabilistic default reasoning [159, 163] , which is a probabilistic generalization of the sophisticated notion of lexicographic entailment by Lehmann [132] in default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases. Due to this semantics, P-SHOIN (D) allows for expressing both terminological probabilistic knowledge about concepts and roles, and also assertional probabilistic knowledge about instances of concepts and roles. It naturally interprets terminological and assertional probabilistic knowledge as statistical knowledge about concepts and roles and as degrees of belief about instances of concepts and roles, respectively, and allows for deriving both statistical knowledge and degrees of belief. As an important additional feature, it also allows for expressing default knowledge about concepts (as a special case of terminological probabilistic knowledge), which is semantically interpreted as in Lehmann's lexicographic default entailment [132] . Roughly, every probabilistic knowledge base consists of (i) a PTBox, which is a classical (description logic) knowledge base along with probabilistic terminological knowledge, and (ii) a collection of PABoxes, which encode probabilistic assertional knowledge about a certain set of individuals. To this end, we partition the set of individuals I into the set of classical individuals I C and the set of probabilistic individuals I P , and we associate with every probabilistic individual a PABox. That is, probabilistic individuals are those individuals in I for which we explicitly store some probabilistic assertional knowledge in a PABox.
We first define conditional constraints as follows. We assume a finite nonempty set C of basic classification concepts (or basic c-concepts for short), which are (not necessarily atomic) concepts in SHOIN (D) that are free of individuals from I P . Informally, they are the relevant description logic concepts for defining probabilistic relationships. The set of classification concepts (or c-concepts) is inductively defined as follows. Every basic c-concept φ ∈ C is a c-concept. If φ and ψ are c-concepts, then ¬φ and (φ ψ) are also c-concepts. We often write (φ ψ) to abbreviate ¬(¬φ ¬ψ), as usual.
A conditional constraint is an expression of the form (ψ|φ) [l, u] , where φ and ψ are c-concepts, and l and u are reals from [0, 1]. Informally, (ψ|φ) [l, u] encodes that the probability of ψ given φ lies between l and u.
A PTBox, a PABox, and a probabilistic knowledge bases are defined as follows: (i) A PTBox PT = (T, P ) consists of a classical (description logic) knowledge base T and a finite set of conditional constraints P ; (ii) A PABox P is a finite set of conditional constraints; and (iii) a probabilistic knowledge base KB = (T, P, (P o ) o∈IP ) relative to I P consists of a PTBox PT = (T, P ) and one PABox P o for every probabilistic individual o ∈ I P . The meaning of a conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[l, u] depends on whether it belongs to P or to P o for some probabilistic individual o ∈ I P : -Each (ψ|φ) [l, u] in P informally encodes that "generally, if an object belongs to φ, then it belongs to ψ with a probability in [l, u]". For example, (∃R.{o}|φ) [l, u] in P , where o ∈ I C and R ∈ R A , encodes that "generally, if an object belongs to φ, then it is related to o by R with a probability in [l, u]".
where o ∈ I P , informally encodes that "if o belongs to φ, then o belongs to ψ with a probability in [l, u]". For example, (∃R.{o }|φ) [l, u] in P o , where o ∈ I P , o ∈ I C , and R ∈ R A , expresses that "if o belongs to φ, then o is related to o by R with a probability in
So, a probabilistic knowledge base KB = (T, P, (P o ) o∈IP ) extends a classical knowledge base T by probabilistic terminological knowledge P and probabilistic assertional knowledge P o about every o ∈ I P . That is, P represents our statistical knowledge about concepts, while every P o represents our degrees of belief about o.
Observe that the axioms in T and the conditional constraints in every P o with o ∈ I P are strict (that is, they must always hold), while the conditional constraints in P are defeasible (that is, they may have exceptions and thus do not always have to hold), since T ∪ P may not always be satisfiable as a whole in combination with our degrees of belief (and then we ignore some elements of P ).
Consequently, a conditional constraint (ψ|φ) [1, 1] in P encodes "generally, if an object belongs to φ, then it also belongs to ψ", while (ψ|φ) [1, 1] in P o encodes "if o belongs to φ, then o also belongs to ψ". The latter is equivalent to the implication o : φ ⇒ o : ψ, while the former is in general not equivalent to φ ψ.
Semantics. Now we define the semantics of P-SHOIN (D).
After some preliminaries, we introduce the notions of consistency and lexicographic entailment for probabilistic knowledge bases, which are based on the notions of consistency and lexicographic entailment, respectively, in probabilistic default reasoning [159, 163] .
We now define (possible) objects and probabilistic interpretations, which are certain sets of basic c-concepts resp. probability functions on the set of all (possible) objects. We also define the satisfaction of classical knowledge bases and conditional constraints in probabilistic interpretations.
A (possible) object o is a set of basic c-concepts φ ∈ C such that {i : φ | φ ∈ o} ∪ {i : ¬φ | φ ∈ C \ o} is satisfiable, where i is a new individual. Informally, every object o represents an individual i that is fully specified on C in the sense that o belongs (resp., does not belong) to every c-concept φ ∈ o (resp., φ ∈ C \ o). We denote by O C the set of all objects relative to C. An object o satisfies a classical knowledge base
The satisfaction of c-concepts by objects is inductively extended to all c-concepts, as usual, by (i) o |= ¬φ iff o |= φ does not hold, and (ii) o |= φ ψ iff o |= φ and o |= ψ. It is not difficult to verify that a classical knowledge base T is satisfiable iff an object o ∈ O C exists that satisfies T .
A probabilistic interpretation Pr is a probability function on O C (that is, a map-
We define the probability of a c-concept and the satisfaction of conditional constraints in probabilistic interpretations as follows. The probability of a c-concept φ in a probabilistic interpretation Pr denoted Pr (φ), is the sum of all Pr (o) such that o |= φ. For c-concepts φ and ψ such that Pr (φ) > 0, we write Pr (ψ|φ) to abbreviate Pr (φ ψ) / Pr(φ). We say Pr satisfies a condi-
We say Pr satisfies a set of conditional constraints F , or Pr is a model of F , denoted Pr |= F , iff Pr |= F for all F ∈ F. It is not difficult to verify that a classical knowledge base T is satisfiable iff there exists a probabilistic interpretation that satisfies T .
The notion of consistency for PTBoxes and probabilistic knowledge bases is based on the notion of consistency in probabilistic default reasoning [159, 163] . We first give some preparative definitions. A probabilistic interpretation Pr verifies a conditional constraint (ψ|φ) [l, u] iff Pr (φ) = 1 and Pr (ψ) ∈ [l, u] , that is, iff Pr (φ) = 1 and Pr |= (ψ|φ) [l, u] . We say Pr falsifies (ψ|φ) [l, u] iff Pr (φ) = 1 and Pr |= (ψ|φ) [l, u] . A set of conditional constraints F tolerates a conditional constraint F under a classical knowledge base T iff T ∪ F has a model that verifies F .
A PTBox PT = (T, P ) is consistent iff (i) T is satisfiable and (ii) there exists an ordered partition (P 0 , . . . , P k ) of P such that each P i with i ∈ {0, . . . , k} is the set of all
. Informally, condition (ii) means that P has a natural ordered partition into collections of conditional constraints of increasing specificities such that every collection is locally consistent. That is, any inconsistencies can be naturally resolved by preferring more specific pieces of knowledge to less specific ones. For example, the inconsistency between (¬∃ HasColor.{red} | Car) [1, 1] and (∃ HasColor.{red} | SportsCar) [1, 1] when reasoning about sports cars is naturally resolved by preferring the latter to the former. We call the above (unique) ordered partition
is consistent and (ii) T ∪ P o is satisfiable for every probabilistic individual o ∈ I P . Informally, (ii) says that the strict knowledge in T must be compatible with the strict degrees of belief in P o , for every probabilistic individual o. Observe that (i) involves T and P , while (ii) involves T and P o , for every probabilistic individual o. This separate treatment of P and the P o 's is due to the fact that P represents probabilistic terminological knowledge, while each P o represents probabilistic assertional knowledge (about o).
The notion of lexicographic entailment for probabilistic knowledge bases is based on lexicographic entailment in probabilistic default reasoning [159, 163] . In the sequel, let KB = (T, P, (P o ) o∈IP ) be a consistent probabilistic knowledge base. We first define a lexicographic preference relation on probabilistic interpretations, which is then used to define the notion of lexicographic entailment for sets of conditional constraints under PTBoxes. We finally define the notion of lexicographic entailment for deriving statistical knowledge and degrees of belief about probabilistic objects from PTBoxes and probabilistic knowledge bases, respectively.
We use the (unique) z-partition (P 0 , . . . , P k ) of (T, P ) to define a lexicographic preference relation on probabilistic interpretations Pr and Pr : We say Pr is lexicographically preferable (or lex-preferable) to Pr iff some i ∈ {0, . . . , k} exists such that
Roughly speaking, this preference relation implements the idea of preferring more specific pieces of knowledge to less specific ones in the case of local inconsistencies. It can thus be used for ignoring the latter when drawing conclusions in the case of local inconsistencies. A model Pr of a classical knowledge base T and a set of conditional constraints F is a lexicographically minimal (or lex-minimal) model of T ∪ F iff no model of T ∪ F is lex-preferable to Pr .
We define the notion of lexicographic entailment of conditional constraints from sets of conditional constraints under PTBoxes as follows. A conditional constraint We now define which statistical knowledge and degrees of belief follow under lexicographic entailment from PTBoxes PT and probabilistic knowledge bases KB = (T, P,
The main reasoning problems in P-SHOIN (D) are summarized by the following decision and computation problems (where every lower and upper bound in the PTBox PT = (T, P ), the probabilistic knowledge base KB = (T, P, (P o ) o∈IP ), and the set of conditional constraints F is rational):
PTBOX CONSISTENCY (PTCON): Given a PTBox PT = (T, P ), decide whether PT is consistent.
PROBABILISTIC KNOWLEDGE BASE CONSISTENCY (PKBCON): Given a probabilistic knowledge base KB = (T, P, (P o ) o∈IP ), decide whether KB is consistent.
TIGHT LEXICOGRAPHIC ENTAILMENT (TLEXENT): Given a PTBox PT = (T, P ), a finite set of conditional constraints F , and two c-concepts φ and ψ, compute the rational numbers l, u
under PT . Some important special cases of TLEXENT are given as follows: (PCSUB) given a consistent PTBox PT and two c-concepts φ and ψ, compute the rational numbers l, u 
There exists an algorithm for deciding whether a PTBox (resp., probabilistic knowledge base) in P-SHOIN (D) is consistent, which is based on a reduction to deciding whether a classical knowledge base in SHOIN(D) is satisfiable and to deciding whether a system of linear constraints is solvable. More specifically, one has to solve a sequence of solvability problems of systems of linear constraints, whose variables are computed by deciding classical knowledge base satisfiability in SHOIN (D) (see [167] for further details). This shows that the two consistency problems in P-SHOIN (D) are both decidable. Furthermore, there is a similar algorithm for computing tight intervals under lexicographic entailment in P-SHOIN (D), which is based on a reduction to deciding classical knowledge base satisfiability in SHOIN(D) and to solving linear optimization problems (see [167] ). Thus, also lexicographic entailment in P-SHOIN (D) is computable. As for the computational complexity, deciding the two consistency problems in P-SHOIN (D) is complete for the complexity class NEXP, while computing tight intervals under lexicographic entailment in P-SHOIN (D) belongs to FP NEXP [167] . Note that if the chosen classical description logic allows for decidable knowledge base satisfiability, then also the main reasoning tasks in the probabilistic extension are all decidable. (see [167, 171] for further details).
There are already implementations of its predecessor P-SHOQ(D) (see [200] ) and of a probabilistic description logic based on probabilistic default reasoning as in [159, 163] . Recently, the Pronto system 1 , claims to have implemented P-SHOIN (D). Other approaches. Other approaches to probabilistic description logics can be classified according to the generalized classical description logics, the supported forms of probabilistic knowledge, the underlying probabilistic semantics, and the reasoning techniques. One of the earliest approaches to probabilistic description logics is due to Heinsohn [99] , who presents a probabilistic extension of the description logic ALC, which allows to represent terminological probabilistic knowledge about concepts and roles, and which is based on the notion of logical entailment in probabilistic logics, similar to [5, 81, 157, 207] . Heinsohn [99] , however, does not allow for assertional (classical or probabilistic) knowledge about concept and role instances. The main reasoning problems are deciding the consistency of probabilistic terminological knowledge bases and computing logically entailed tight probability intervals. Heinsohn proposes a sound and complete global reasoning technique based on classical reasoning in ALC and linear programming, as well as a sound but incomplete local reasoning technique based on the iterative application of local inference rules.
Another early approach to probabilistic description logics is due to Jaeger [112] , who also proposes a probabilistic extension of the description logic ALC, which allows for terminological probabilistic knowledge about concepts and roles, and assertional probabilistic knowledge about concept instances, but does not support assertional probabilistic knowledge about role instances (but he mentions a possible extension in this direction). The entailment of terminological probabilistic knowledge from terminological probabilistic knowledge is based on the notion of logical entailment in probabilistic logic, while the entailment of assertional probabilistic knowledge from terminological and assertional probabilistic knowledge is based on a cross-entropy minimization relative to terminological probabilistic knowledge. The main reasoning problems are terminological probabilistic consistency and inference, which are solved by linear programming, and assertional probabilistic consistency and inference, which are solved by an approximation algorithm.
The recent work by Dürig and Studer [66] presents a further probabilistic extension of ALC, which is based on a model-theoretic semantics as in probabilistic logics, but which only allows for assertional probabilistic knowledge about concept and role instances, and not for terminological probabilistic knowledge. The paper also explores independence assumptions for assertional probabilistic knowledge. The main reasoning problem is deciding the consistency of assertional probabilistic knowledge, but neither an algorithm nor a decidability result is given.
Jaeger's recent work [113] focuses on interpreting probabilistic concept subsumption and probabilistic role quantification through statistical sampling distributions, and develops a probabilistic version of the guarded fragment of first-order logic. The semantics is different from the semantics of all the other probabilistic description logics in this paper, since it is based on probability distributions over the domain, and not on the more commonly used probability distributions over a set of possible worlds. The paper proposes a sound Gentzen-style sequent calculus for the logic, but it neither proves the completeness of this calculus nor decidability in general.
Koller et al.'s work [125] presents the probabilistic description logic P-CLASSIC, which is a probabilistic generalization (of a variant) of the description logic CLASSIC. Similar to Heinsohn's work [99] , it allows for encoding terminological probabilistic knowledge about concepts, roles, and attributes (via so-called p-classes), but it does not support assertional (classical or probabilistic) knowledge about instances of concepts and roles. However, in contrast to [99] , its probabilistic semantics is based on a reduction to Bayesian networks. The main reasoning problem is to determine the exact probabilities for conditionals between concept expressions in canonical form. This problem is solved by a reduction to inference in Bayesian networks. As an important feature of P-CLASSIC, the above problem can be solved in polynomial time, when the underlying Bayesian network is a polytree. Note that a recent implementation of P-CLASSIC is described in [115] .
Closely related work by Yelland [285] proposes a probabilistic extension of a description logic close to FL, whose probabilistic semantics is also based on a reduction to Bayesian networks, and it applies this approach to market analysis. The approach allows for encoding terminological probabilistic knowledge about concepts and roles, but it does not support assertional (classical or probabilistic) knowledge about instances of concepts and roles. Like in Koller et al.'s work [125] , the main reasoning problem is to determine the exact probabilities for conditionals between concepts, which is solved by a reduction to inference in Bayesian networks.
Probabilistic Web Ontology Languages. The literature contains several probabilistic generalizations of web ontology languages. Many of these approaches focus especially on combining the web ontology language OWL with probabilistic formalisms based on Bayesian networks.
In particular, da Costa [28] , da Costa and Laskey [29] , and da Costa et al. [30] suggest a probabilistic generalization of OWL, called PR-OWL, whose probabilistic semantics is based on multi-entity Bayesian networks (MEBNs). The latter are a Bayesian logic that combines first-order logic with Bayesian networks. Roughly speaking, PR-OWL represents knowledge as parameterized fragments of Bayesian networks. Hence, it can encode probability distributions on the interpretations of an associated first-order theory as well as repeated structure.
In [54, 55] , Ding et al. propose a probabilistic generalization of OWL, called Bayes-OWL, which is based on standard Bayesian networks. BayesOWL provides a set of rules and procedures for the direct translation of an OWL ontology into a Bayesian network, and it also provides a method for incorporating available probability constraints when constructing the Bayesian network. The generated Bayesian network, which preserves the semantics of the original ontology and which is consistent with all the given probability constraints, supports ontology reasoning, both within and across ontologies, as Bayesian inferences. In [55, 212] , Ding et al. also describe an application of the BayesOWL approach in ontology mapping.
In closely related work, Mitra et al. [194] describe an implemented technique, called OMEN, to enhancing existing ontology mappings by using a Bayesian network to represent the influences between potential concept mappings across ontologies. More concretely, OMEN is based on a simple ontology model similar to RDF Schema. It uses a set of meta-rules that capture the influence of the ontology structure and the semantics of ontology relations, and matches nodes that are neighbours of already matched nodes in the two ontologies.
Yang and Calmet [282] present an integration of the web ontology language OWL with Bayesian networks, called OntoBayes. The approach makes use of probability and dependency-annotated OWL to represent uncertain information in Bayesian networks. The work also describes an application in risk analysis for insurance and natural disaster management. Pool and Aikin [214] also provide a method for representing uncertainty in OWL ontologies, while Fukushige [83] proposes a basic framework for representing probabilistic relationships in RDF. Nottelmann and Fuhr [208] present two probabilistic extensions of variants of OWL Lite, along with a mapping to locally stratified probabilistic Datalog.
Another important work is due to Udrea et al. [272] , who present a probabilistic generalization of RDF, which allows for representing terminological probabilistic knowledge about classes and assertional probabilistic knowledge about properties of individuals. They provide a technique for assertional probabilistic inference in acyclic probabilistic RDF theories, which is based on the notion of logical entailment in probabilistic logic, coupled with a local probabilistic semantics. They also provide a prototype implementation of their algorithms.
An important application for probabilistic ontologies (and thus probabilistic description logics and ontology languages) is especially information retrieval. In particular, Subrahmanian's group [109, 271] explores the use of probabilistic ontologies in relational databases. They propose to extend relations by associating with every attribute a constrained probabilistic ontology, which describes relationships between terms occurring in the domain of that attribute. An extension of the relational algebra then allows for an increased recall (which is the proportion of documents relevant to a search query in the collection of all returned documents) in information retrieval. In closely related work, Mantay et al. [182] propose a probabilistic least common subsumer operation, which is based on a probabilistic extension of the description logic ALN . They show that applying this approach in information retrieval allows for reducing the amount of retrieved data and thus for avoiding information flood. Another closely related work by Holi and Hyvönen [101, 102] shows how degrees of overlap between concepts can be modelled and computed efficiently using Bayesian networks based on RDF(S) ontologies. Such degrees of overlap indicate how well an individual data item matches the query concept, and can thus be used for measuring the relevance in information retrieval tasks. Finally, Weikum et al. [280] and Thomas and Sheth [268] describe the use of probabilistic ontologies in information retrieval from a more general perspective. [107] ; Dubois et al. [58] and more recently in [217] .
Possibilistic Uncertainty and Description Logics. Similar to probabilistic extensions of description logics, possibilistic extensions of description logics have been developed by Hollunder
A possibilistic axiom is of the form P α l or N α l, where α is a classical description logic axiom, and l is a real number from [0, 1]. A possibilistic RBox (resp., TBox, ABox) is a finite set of possibilistic axioms P α l or N α l, where α is an RBox (resp., TBox, ABox) axiom. A possibilistic knowledge base KB = (R, T , A) consists of a possibilistic RBox R, a possibilistic TBox T , and a possibilistic ABox A. The semantics is a straightforward extension from the propositional case to the FOL case.
The main reasoning problems related to possibilistic description logics are deciding whether a possibilistic knowledge base is satisfiable, deciding whether a possibilistic axiom is a logical consequence of a possibilistic knowledge base, and computing the tight lower and upper bounds entailed by a possibilistic knowledge base for the necessity and the possibility of a classical description logic axiom. As shown by Hollunder [107] , deciding logical consequences, and thus also deciding satisfiability and computing tight lower and upper bounds can be reduced to deciding logical consequences in classical description logics. We are interested to the question whether or not that Tom is a golfer. It can be shown that KB |= P(tom : Golf er) 0.7 .
A recent implementation of reasoning in possibilistic description logics using KAON2 2 is reported in [218, 219] . We recall that Liau and Yao [139] report on an application of possibilistic description logics in information retrieval. More concretely, they define a possibilistic generalization of the description logic ALC and show that it can be used in typical information retrieval problems, such as query relaxation, query restriction, and exemplar-based retrieval. Possibilistic description logics can also be used for handling inconsistencies in ontologies [218, 219] . Another important application of possibilistic description logics is the representation of user preferences in the Semantic Web. For example, the recent work by Hadjali et al. [90] shows that possibilistic logic can be nicely used for encoding user preferences in the context of databases.
Vagueness and Description Logics. There are several extensions of description logics and ontology languages using the theory of fuzzy logic. They can be classified according to (a) the description logic resp. ontology language that they generalize, (b) the allowed fuzzy constructs, (c) the underlying fuzzy logics, and (d) their reasoning algorithms.
In general, fuzzy DLs allow expressions of the form (a : C, n), stating that a is an instance of concept C with degree at least n, that is the FOL formula C(a) is true to degree at least n (it is straightforward to map DL expressions into FOL formulae). Similarly, (C 1 C 2 , n) and (R 1 R 2 , n) state vague subsumption relationships. Informally, (C 1 C 2 , n) dictates that the FOL formula ∀x.C 1 (x) → C 2 (x) is always true to degree at least n (note that in mathematical fuzzy logic, the universal quantification ∀x is interpreted as inf x , and similarly, ∃x is interpreted as sup x and, that not always ¬∀ is the same as ∃¬, -this is true only for Zadeh logic and Łukasiewicz logic).
Specifically, fuzzy DLs supports concrete data types such as reals, integers, strings and allows the definition of concepts with explicit representation of fuzzy membership functions. This is implemented by relying on so-called fuzzy data type theory. A fuzzy data type theory D = (Δ D , · D ) is such that · D assigns to every n-ary data type predicate d an n-ary fuzzy relation over Δ D [176] . For instance, the predicate 18 may be a unary crisp predicate over the natural numbers denoting the set of integers smaller or equal to 18. Concerning non-crisp fuzzy domain predicates, we recall that in fuzzy set theory and practice, there are many functions for specifying fuzzy set membership degrees. However, the trapezoidal ( Fig. 2 (a) ), the triangular (Fig. 2 (b) ), the L-function (left-shoulder function, Fig. 2 (c) ), and the R-function (right-shoulder function, Fig. 2  (d) ) are simple, but most frequently used to specify membership degrees. These functions are defined over the set of non-negative rationals Q + ∪ {0} For instance, we may define Y oung : N → [0, 1] D to be a fuzzy concrete predicate over the natural numbers denoting the degree of youngness of a person's age, as Y oung(x) = ls (10, 30) . Fuzzy DLs allow fuzzy modifiers, such as very, more or less and slightly, which apply to fuzzy sets to change their membership function. Formally, a modifier is a function f m : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. We will allow modifiers defined in terms of linear hedges (Figure 2 (f) ) and triangular functions (Figure 2 (d) ). Modifiers have also been considered in [105, 269] .
Furthermore, fuzzy DLs extend crisp DLs with some specific constructs, which we define next (see, e.g. [ 
14]). Let A, R A , R D , I, I c and M be non-empty finite and pairwise disjoint sets of concepts names (denoted A), abstract roles names (denoted R), concrete roles names (denoted T ), abstract individual names (denoted x, y), concrete individual names (denoted v) and modifiers (denoted m).
Concepts may be seen as unary predicates, while roles may be seen as binary predicates. R A also contains a nonempty subset F a of abstract feature names (denoted r), while R D contains a non-empty subset F c of concrete feature names (denoted t). Features are functional roles. Besides the usual concept forming constructs, a fuzzy DL supports also constructs dealing with concrete data types, that is it has the additional concept constructs:
where val is an integer, a real or a string depending on the range of the concrete feature t. For instance, the expression Human ( hasAge 18) will denote the set of humans, which have an age less or equal than 18, while Human ∃hasAge.ln (10, 30) will denote the set of young humans (their age is L (10, 30) ). Finally, additional useful concept constructs are:
where Fuzzy DLs also allow to write ⇒ in order to specify the particular implication function to be used in the semantics of the GCI (General Concept Inclusion Axiom), e.g., Łukasiewicz or Gödel.
A fuzzy RBox R is a finite set of role axioms of the form:
-(f un R), stating that a role R is functional, that is R is a feature.
-(trans R), stating that a role R is transitive.
-R 1 R 2 , meaning that role R 2 subsumes role R 1 .
-(inv R 1 R 2 ), stating that role R 2 is the inverse of R 1 (and vice versa).
A simple role is a role which is neither transitive nor has a transitive subroles. An important restriction is that functional needs to be simple.
Semantics.
The main idea is that concepts and roles are interpreted as fuzzy subsets of an interpretation's domain. Therefore, axioms, rather than being "classical" evaluated (being either true or false), they are "many-valued" evaluated in 
-to each concrete feature t a partial function t I : 
The mapping ·
I is extended to roles and complex concepts as specified in Table 5 , while the mapping · I is extended to the other constructs as specified in Table 6 . The notion of satisfaction of a fuzzy axiom E by a fuzzy interpretation I, denoted I |= E, is defined as follows:
We say that concept C is satisfiable iff there is an interpretation I and an individual x ∈ Δ I such that C I (x) > 0. For a set of axioms E, we say that I satisfies E iff I satisfies each element in E. We say that I is a model of E (resp. E) iff I |= E (resp. I |= E). I satisfies (is a model of) a fuzzy KB KB = (A, T , R), denoted I |= KB , iff I is a model of each component A, T and R, respectively.
An axiom E is a logical consequence of a knowledge base KB , denoted KB |= E iff every model of KB satisfies E.
Given KB and a fuzzy axiom τ of the forms x : C, α , (x, y): R, α or C D, α , it is of interest to compute τ 's best lower degree value bound. The greatest lower bound of τ w.r.t. KB (denoted glb(KB, τ) ) is glb(KB, τ) = sup{n | KB |= (τ, n) }, where sup ∅ = 0. Determining the glb is called the Best Degree Bound (BDB) problem.
Finally, another similar problem is to compute the best satisfiability bound of a concept C and amounts to determine glb(KB, C) = sup I sup x∈Δ I {C I (x) | I |= KB }. Essentially, among all models I of the KB, we are determining the maximal degree of truth that the concept C may have over all individuals x ∈ Δ I .
Example 3.3. Assume, that a car seller sells a sedan car. A buyer is looking for a second hand passenger car. Both the buyer as well as the seller have preferences (restrictions). Our aim is to find the best agreement. The preferences are as follows. Concerning the buyer:
1. He does not want to pay more than 26000 euro (buyer reservation value). 2. If there is an alarm system in the car then he is completely satisfied with paying no more than 22300 euro, but he can go up to 22750 euro to a lesser degree of satisfaction. 3. He wants a driver insurance and either a theft insurance or a fire insurance. 4. He wants air conditioning and the external colour should be either black or grey. 5. Preferably the price is no more than 22000 euro, but he can go up to 24000 euro to a lesser degree of satisfaction. 6. The kilometer warranty is preferrably at least 175000, but he may go down to 150000 to a lesser degree of satisfaction. 7. The weights of the preferences 2-6 are, (0.1, 0.2, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4). The higher the value the more important is the preference.
Concerning the seller:
1. He wants to sell no less than 22000 euro (seller reservation value) 2. If there is an navigator pack system in the car then he is completely satisfied with paying no less than 22750 euro, but he can go down to 22500 euro to a lesser degree of satisfaction. 3. Preferably the buyer buys the Insurance Plus package. 4. The kilometer warranty is preferrably at most 100000, but he may go up to 125000 to a lesser degree of satisfaction. 5. The monthly warranty is preferrably at most 60, but he may go up to 72 to a lesser degree of satisfaction. 6. If the colour is black then the car has air conditioning. 7. The weights of the preferences 2-6 are, (0.3, 0.1, 0.3, 0.1, 0.2). The higher the value the more important is the preference.
We have also some background theory about the domain:
1. A sedan is a passenger car. 2. A satellite alarm system is an alarm system. 3. The navigator pack is a satellite alarm system with a GPS system. 4. The Insurance Plus package is a driver insurance together with a theft insurance. 5. The car colours are black or grey. Now, the background theory can be encoded as: The buyer's preferences can be encoded as follows:
Similarly to the buyer case, the concept Sell collects all the seller's preferences together in such a way that the higher is the maximal degree of satisfiability of Sell (that is glb(KB, Sell)), the more the seller is satisfied. Now, it is clear that the best agreement among the buyer and the seller is determined by the maximal degree of satisfiability of the conjunction Buy Sell, that is we have to determine glb(KB, Buy Sell). In particular, we rely on Łukasiewicz conjunction, which guarantees that the solution is Pareto optimal [220] . In particular, we have that glb(KB, Buy Ł Sell) = 0.7
HasP rice = 22000.0 HasKM W arranty = 175000.0
HasM W arranty = 0.0 .
So an optimal match (the Pareto optimal degree is 0.7625) would be an agreement with a price of 22500 euro, with 100000 kilometer warranty and a 60 month warranty. 2
The first work about fuzzy DLs is due to Yen [286] , who proposes a fuzzy extension of a very restricted sublanguage of ALC, called FL − [18, 133] . The work includes fuzzy terminological knowledge, but no fuzzy assertional knowledge, and it is based on Zadeh logic. It already informally talks about the use of fuzzy modifiers and fuzzy concrete domains. Though, the unique reasoning facility, the subsumption test, is a crisp yes/no questioning. Tresp and Molitor [269] consider a more general extension of fuzzy ALC. Like Yen, they also allow for fuzzy terminological knowledge along with a special form of fuzzy modifiers (which are a combination of two linear functions), but no fuzzy assertional knowledge, and they assume Zadeh logic as underlying fuzzy logic. The work also presents a sound and complete reasoning algorithm testing the subsumption relationship using a linear programming oracle.
Another fuzzy extension of ALC is due to Straccia [243, 245, 251, 256, 265] , who allows for both fuzzy terminological and fuzzy assertional knowledge, but not for fuzzy modifiers and fuzzy concrete domains, and again assumes Zadeh logic as underlying fuzzy logic. Straccia [243, 245] also introduces the best truth value bound problem and provides a sound and complete reasoning algorithm based on completion rules. In [244] , Straccia reports a four-valued variant of fuzzy ALC. In the same spirit, Hölldobler et al. [103, 104 ] extend Straccia's fuzzy ALC with concept modifiers of the form f m (x) = x β , where β > 0, and present a sound and complete reasoning algorithm (based on completion rules) for the graded subsumption problem.
Straccia's works [247, 255, 261] are essentially as [245] , except that now the set of possible truth values is a complete lattice rather than [0, 1].
Sanchez and Tettamanzi [227, 228, 229] consider a fuzzy extension of the description logic ALCQ (without assertional component) under Zadeh logic, and they start addressing the issue of a fuzzy semantics of quantifiers. Essentially, fuzzy quantifiers allow to state sentences such as FaithfulCustomer (Most )buys.LowCalorie-Food encoding "the set of all individuals that mostly buy low calorie food". An algorithm is presented, which calculates the satisfiability interval for a fuzzy concept.
Hájek [96, 97] considers a fuzzy extension of the description logic ALC under arbitrary t-norms. He provides in particular algorithms for deciding whether (C D, 1) is a tautology and whether (C D, 1) is satisfiable, which are based on a reduction to the propositional BL logic for which a Hilbert-style axiomatization exists [95] (but see also [97] for the complexity of rational Pavelka logic, and see [16] for some complexity results on reasoning in fuzzy description logics).
Straccia [246] provides a translation of fuzzy ALC (with general concept inclusion axioms) into classical ALC. The translation is modular, and thus expected to be extendable to more expressive fuzzy description logics as well. The main idea is to translate a fuzzy assertion of the form (a : C, n) into a crisp assertion a : C n , with the intended meaning "a is an instance of C to degree at least n". Then, concept inclusion axioms are used to correctly relate the C n 's. For example, C 0.7 C 0.6 is used to encode that whenever an individual is an instance of C to degree at least 0.7, then it is also an instance of C to degree at least 0.6. The translation is at most quadratic in the size of the fuzzy knowledge base. Note that the translation does not yet work in the presence of fuzzy modifiers and fuzzy concrete domains. Bobillo et al. [12] extend the approach to a variant of fuzzy SHOIN . The idea has further been considered in the works [137, 138] , which essentially provide a crisp language in which expressions of, e.g., the form a : ∀R 0.8 .C 0.9 are allowed, with the intended meaning "if a has an R-successor to degree at least 0.8, then this successor is also an instance of C to degree at least 0.9". The idea has further been extended to a distributed variant of fuzzy description logics in [149] . A mapping to classical DLs under Łukasiewicz semantics has been provided in [15] for the fuzzy DL ALCHOI.
An interesting extension is due to Kang et al. [43] , who extends fuzzy description logics by comparison operators, e.g., to state that "Tom is taller than Tim". Another interesting extension is proposed by Dubois et al. [58] , who combine fuzzy description logics with possibility theory. Essentially, since (a : C, n) is Boolean (either an interpretation satisfies it or not), we can build on top of it an uncertainty logic, which is based on possibility theory in [58] .
We recall that usually the semantics used for fuzzy description logics is based on Zadeh logic, but where the concept inclusion is crisp, that is, C D is viewed as ∀x.C(x) D(x). In [106, 269] , a calculus for fuzzy ALC [230] with fuzzy modifiers and simple TBoxes under Zadeh logic is reported. No indication for the BTVB problem is given. Straccia [243, 245] reports a calculus for fuzzy ALC and simple TBoxes under Zadeh logic and addresses the BTVB problem. How the satisfiability problem and the BTVB problem can be reduced to classical ALC, and thus can be solved by means of tools like FaCT and RACER is shown in [246] . Results providing a tableaux calculus for fuzzy SHIN under Zadeh logic (but only allowing for a restricted form of concept inclusion axioms, which are called fuzzy inclusion introductions and fuzzy equivalence introductions), by adapting similar techniques as for the classical counterpart, are shown in [239, 240] . Fuzzy general concept inclusion axioms under Zadeh logic can be managed as described in [242] . Also interesting is the work [283] , which provides a tableau for fuzzy SHI with general concept inclusion axioms. Finally, the reasoning techniques for classical SHOIN (D) [108] can be extended to [245] , as [238, 239, 240, 241] already show.
On the other hand, fuzzy tableaux algorithms under Zadeh semantics do not seem to be suitable to be adapted to other semantics, such as Łukasiewicz logic. Even more problematic is the fact that they are yet unable to deal with fuzzy concrete domains [248] , that is the possibility to allow an explicit representation of fuzzy membership functions. Despite these negative results, recently, [248, 249] report a calculus for fuzzy ALC(D) whenever the connectives, the modifiers, and the fuzzy datatype predicates are representable as bounded mixed integer linear programs (MILPs). For example, Łukasiewicz logic satisfies these conditions as well as the membership functions for fuzzy datatype predicates that we have presented in this paper. Additionally, modifiers should be a combination of linear functions. In that case, the calculus consists of a set of constraint propagation rules and an invocation to an oracle for MILP. The method has been extended to fuzzy SHIF(D) [262] (the description logic behind OWL Lite) and a reasoner, called fuzzyDL [14] , has been implemented and is available at Straccia's web page. FuzzyDL supports more features, which we do not address here. The use of MILP for reasoning in fuzzy description logics is not surprising as their use for automated deduction in many-valued logics is well-known [92, 93] . Bobillo and Straccia [13] provide a calculus for fuzzy ALC(D) under product semantics.
A very recent problem for fuzzy description logics is the top-k retrieval problem. While in classical semantics, a tuple satisfies or does not satisfy a query, in fuzzy description logics, a tuple may satisfy a query to a degree. Hence, for example, given a conjunctive query over a fuzzy description logic knowledge base, it is of interest to compute only the top-k answers. While in relational databases, this problem is a current research area (see, e.g., [73, 110, 135] ), very few is known for the case of first-order knowledge bases in general (but see [259] ) and description logics in particular. The only works that we are aware of are [254, 260, 266] , which deal with the problem of finding the top-k result over knowledge bases in a fuzzy generalization of DL-Lite [23] (note that [210, 211] is subsumed by [260] , though in [210, 211] the storage systems is no-longer a database, but a RDF storage system).
Fuzzy logic has numerous practical applications in general (see, e.g., [124] ). Related to fuzzy description logics, we point out that they have first been proposed for logicbased information retrieval [192] , which originated from the idea to annotate textual documents with graded description logic sentences, which goes back to [193] . The idea has been reconsidered in [240, 266, 288] . In particular, (i) Zhang et al. [288] describe a semantic portal that is based on fuzzy description logics; (ii) Li et al. [136] present an improved semantic search model by integrating inference and information retrieval and an implementation in the security domain; (iii) Straccia and Visco [266] report on a multimedia information retrieval system based on a fuzzy DLR-Lite description logic, which is capable to deal with hundreds of thousands of images. D'Aquin et al. [42] provide a use case in the medical domain, where fuzzy concrete domains are used to identify tumor regions in x-ray images. Agarwal and Lamparter [1] use fuzzy description logics to improve searching and comparing products in electronic markets. They provide a more expressive search mechanism that is closer to human reasoning and that aggregates multiple search criteria to a single value (ranking of an offer relative to the query), thus enabling a better selection of offers to be considered for the negotiation. Liu et al. [140] use a fuzzy description logic to model the management part in project selection tasks. Finally, [14] shows also how to use fuzzyDLs for e-Commerce Matchmaking and Semantic Fuzzy Control.
The Case of Logic Programs
In logic programming, the management of imperfect information has attracted the attention of many researchers and numerous frameworks have been proposed. Addressing all of them is almost impossible, due to both the large number of works published in this field (early works date back to early 80-ties [236] ) and the different approaches proposed (see the appendix for a list of references). Like for the DL case, essentially they differ in the underlying notion of uncertainty theory and vagueness theory (probability theory, possibilistic logic, fuzzy logic and multi-valued logic) and how uncertainty/vagueness values, associated to rules and facts, are managed.
Basically [141] , a logic program P is made out by a set of rules and a set of facts. Facts are atoms of the form P (t 1 , . . . , t n ), where t i is a term (usually, a constant or  a variable) . In most cases, facts are ground. On the other hand rules are of the form  A ← B 1 , . . . , B n , where each A and B i is an atom. B 1 , . . . , B n is called body, while A is called head of the rule. The intended meaning of a rules is that "if all B i are true, then also A is true". From a FOL perspective, a rule is just a FOL formula ∀x.B 1 ∧. . .∧ B n → A, where x are all the variables occurring in the rule. Such logic programs are called positive as no literal occurs. In case a literal occurs in the body, then we speak about normal logic programs. We may also have a disjunction of atoms in the head, and then we talk about disjunctive logic programs ( [234] ). In the most general setting, literals are allowed in the head as well and from a semantics point of view, the stable model semantics [84] is widely adopted.
Probabilistic Uncertainty and Logic Programs. The variety of proposals of logic programming under probability theory is huge and an description of most of them is out of the scope of this work. We describe here some groups of works.
In probabilistic generalizations of (annotated) logic programs (see [122] ) based on probabilistic logic fall works such as [44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 201, 202] , where rules have the form of annotated logic programming rules. In probabilistic generalizations of logic programs based on Bayesian networks / causal models fall works such as [11, 117, 118, 204, 215, 216] . Interesting is Poole's Independent Choice Logic (ICL) approach. It is based on acyclic logic programs P under different "choices". Each choice along with P produces a first-order model. By placing a probability distribution over the different choices, one then obtains a distribution over the set of first-order models. Roughly, rules and facts are as for classical logic programs. Additionally, there is a set C of choices of the form { (A 1 : α 1 ) , ..., (A n : α n )}, where A i is an atom and the α i sum-up to 1. A total choice T C is a set of atoms such that from each choice C j ∈ C there is exactly one atom A i i ∈ C j in T C . The probability of a query q w.r.t. to P is the sum of the probabilities p C of total choices T C such that P ∪ T C |= q, where p C is the product of the α j i , for C j i ∈ T C . It is worth to note that the ICL approach generalizes Bayesian networks, influence diagrams, Markov decision processes, and normal form games.
In the third group fall first-order generalization of probabilistic knowledge bases in probabilistic logic (based on logical entailment, lexicographic entailment, and maximum entropy entailment) and comprises works such as [153, 160, 162] . In these works, similarly to P-SHOIN (D), expressions are of the form (ψ|φ) [l, u] , but now ψ, φ are formulae rather than concepts. The development of the semantics parallels to the case of P-SHOIN (D).
For the sake of a concrete example, let us here formally introduce Poole's ICL-based approach. Let us denote with HB Φ (resp., HU Φ ) the Herbrand base (resp., universe) over Φ, where Φ is a function-free first-order vocabulary Φ with finite nonempty sets of constant symbols and predicate symbols.
A choice space C is a set of pairwise disjoint and nonempty sets A ⊆ HB Φ . Any A ∈ C is an alternative of C and any a ∈ A an atomic choice of C. Intuitively, every A ∈ C represents a random variable and every a ∈ A one of its possible values. A total choice of C is a set B ⊆ HB Φ such that |B ∩ A| = 1 for all A ∈ C. Intuitively, every total choice B of C represents an assignment of values to all the random variables. A probability μ on a choice space C is a probability function on the set of all total choices of C. Intuitively, every μ is a probability distribution over the set of all variable assignments. Since C and all its alternatives are finite, μ can be defined by (i) a mapping μ :
Intuitively, (i) defines a probability over the values of each random variable of C, and (ii) assumes independence between the random variables.
A probabilistic logic program KB = (P, C, μ) consists of a logic program P , and a choice space C such that (i) C ⊆ HB Φ and (ii) no atomic choice in C coincides with the head of any rule in ground (P ), and a probability μ on C. Intuitively, since the total choices of C select subsets of P , and μ is a probability distribution on the total choices of C, every probabilistic logic program compactly represents a probability distribution on a finite set of logic programs. A probabilistic query to KB is defined as follows. A formula is inductively defined as (i) and atom; (ii) if φ, ψ are formulae, so are φ ∨ ψ, φ ∧ ψ, ¬ψ, φ → ψ. If φ is a formula and l, u ∈ [0, 1] then ∃φ [l, u] , is a probabilistic query.
Semantics.
A world I is an interpretation over HB Φ . We denote by I Φ the set of all worlds over Φ. A variable assignment σ maps each variable x to some t ∈ HU Φ . It is extended to all terms by σ(c) = c for all constant symbols c from Φ. A world I under σ is a model of an atom A, denoted I |= σ A, iff Aσ ∈ I. The extension of I under σ is a model of a formula φ is as usual. A world I under σ is a model of a rule
A probabilistic interpretation Pr is a probability function on I Φ (that is, a mapping Pr : I Φ → [0, 1] such that (i) the set of all I ∈ I Φ with Pr (I) > 0 is denumerable, and (ii) all Pr (I) with I ∈ I Φ sum up to 1). The probability of a formula φ in Pr under a variable assignment σ, denoted Pr σ (φ) (or Pr (φ) when φ is ground), is the sum of all Pr (I) such that I ∈ I Φ and I |= σ φ.
A probabilistic interpretation Pr is a model of a query ∃φ [l, u] iff Pr σ (φ) ∈ [l, u] for every variable assignment σ. We say Pr is the canonical model of a probabilistic logic program KB = (P, C, μ) iff every world I ∈ I Φ with Pr (I) > 0 is the minimal model of P ∪ {p ← | p ∈ B} for some total choice B of C with Pr (I) = μ(B). Notice that every KB has a unique canonical model Pr . We say that a query ∃φ [l, u] is a consequence of KB , denoted KB ∼ ∃φ [l, u] , iff the canonical model of KB is also a model of ∃φ [l, u] . A query ∃φ [l, u] is a tight consequence of KB , denoted KB ∼ tight ∃φ [l, u] , iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr σ (φ) subject to the canonical model Pr of KB and all σ. A correct answer to ∃φ [l, u] is a substitution σ such that ∃φσ [l, u] is a consequence of KB . A tight answer to ∃φ [l, u] is a substitution σ such that ∃φσ [l, u] is a tight consequence of KB .
As in Section 2.1, we introduce conditional formulae of the form φ | ψ, where φ and ψ are formulae, and conditional probabilistic queries of the form ∃(φ | ψ) [l, u] . A probabilistic interpretation Pr is a model of a conditional probabilistic query ∃(φ | ψ) [l, u] iff Pr σ (φ | ψ) ∈ [l, u] for every variable assignment σ, where Pr σ (φ | ψ) is defined similarly as in Eq. 2: 
and we consider the alternative C a in the choice space C,
. For instance, related to Fig. 1 , we will have a has parents b 1 , . . . , b n , we encode its associated conditional probability table using a rule and an alternative in the choice space:
If a node
For instance, related to Fig. 1 , we will have
The encoding for the node GrassWet is similar. Then, we may infer that Possibilistic Uncertainty and Logic Programs. In possibilistic logic programs [57] , facts are of the form (P (t 1 , . . . , t n ), N l), while rules are of the form (A ← B 1 , . . . , B n , N l). The meaning of them is given directly by the possibilistic FOL formulae, N P (t 1 , . . . , t n ), l and N (∀x.B 1 ∧ . . . ∧ B n → A) l, respectively (the necessity of the formula is greater or equal than l). This basic form has been extended in [206] (which describes also an implementation) to the case of disjunctive logic programming under the stable model semantics, while [2, 3, 4, 25] allow explicitly to deal with fuzzy sets in the language.
Vagueness and Logic Programs. While there is a large literature related to the management of vagueness in logic programs, there are rule forms that are general enough to cover a large amount of them (see e.g., [174, 250, 276] ). Roughly, rules are of the form A ← f (B 1 , ..., B n ), where A, B i are atoms and f is a total function f : S n → S over a truth space S. Computationally, given an assignment/interpretation I of values to the B i , the value of A is computed by stating that A is at least as true as f (I(B 1 ), ..., I(B n ) ). The form of the rules is sufficiently expressive to encompass many approaches to manyvalued logic programming. [174] provides an even more general setting as the function f may also depend on the variables occurring in the rule body. On the other hand there are also some extensions to many-valued disjunctive logic programs [186, 187, 253] . In some cases, e.g. [130] there is also a function g, which dictates how to aggregate the truth values in case an atom is head of several rules.
Most works deal with logic programs without negation and some may provide some technique to answer queries in a top-down manner, as e.g. [35, 122, 130, 252, 276] . On the other hand, there are very few works dealing with normal logic programs [38, 78, 80, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 173, 186, 250, 253, 258, 263] , and little is know about top-down query answering procedures. The only exceptions are [250, 258, 263] .
Another rising problem is the problem to compute the top-k ranked answers to a query, without computing the score of all answers. This allows to answer queries such as "find the top-k closest hotels to the conference location". Solutions to this problem can be found in [174, 259, 264] .
For illustrative purposes, we formally present a quite general logic programming formalism dealing with vagueness.
The truth space that we consider here is the finite set 
Example 3.5 ( [221]
). Suppose we have a car selling site, and we would like to buy a car. The cars belong to the relation CarTable shown in Fig. 3 . Here, the score is implicitly assumed to be 1 in each record. For instance, the first record corresponds to the fact We also assume that the computational cost of f and all fuzzy predicates p i is bounded by a constant.
We call R(x) the head and ∃y.f (R 1 (z 1 ), . . . , R l (z l ), p 1 (z 1 ), . . . , p h (z h )) the body of the rule. We assume that relations occurring in F do not occur in the head of rules (so, we do not allow that the fact relations occurring in F can be redefined by P ). As usual in deductive databases, the relations in F are called extensional relations, while the others are intensional relations.
Example 3.6. Consider again Example 3.5. An excerpt of the domain ontology is described in Fig. 4 and partially encodes the web directory behind the car selling site www.autos.com.
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Semantically, the notion of Herbrand universe HU KB and Herbrand base HB KB are defined as usual as the set of individual constants occurring in KB and the set of ground atoms that can be formed using constants in HU KB and atoms occurring in KB , respectively. An interpretation I maps every n-ary relation R to a partial function if a = b (unique name assumption). Note that, since R I may be a partial function, some tuples may not have a score. Alternatively, we may assume R I to be a total function. We use the former formulation to distinguish the case where a tuple c may be retrieved, even though the score is 0, from the case where a tuple is not retrieved, since it does not satisfy the query. In particular, if a tuple does not belong to an extensional relation, then its score is assumed to be undefined, while if R I is total, then the score of this tuple would be 0.
An interpretation I is a model of (or satisfies) a fact R(c 1 We say I is a model of a knowledge base KB , denoted I |= KB , iff I is a model of each expression E ∈ F ∪ P . We say KB entails R(c) to degree s, denoted KB |= R(c), s , iff for each model I of KB , it is true that R I (c) s whenever R I (c) is defined. The greatest lower bound of R(c) relative to KB is glb(KB , R(c)) = sup{s | KB |= R(c), s }.
Example 3.7. Consider again Example 3.6. Now, suppose that in buying a car, preferably we would like to pay around $12000 and the car should have less than 15000 km. Of course, our constraints on price and kilometers are not crisp as we may still accept to some degree, e.g., a car's cost of $12200 and with 16000 km. Hence, these constraints are rather vague. We model this by means of left-shoulder functions (see Fig. 2 ). We may model the vague constraint on the cost with ls(10000, 14000)(x) dictating that we are definitely satisfied if the price is less than $10000, but can pay up to $14000 to a lesser degree of satisfaction. Similarly, we may model the vague constraint on the kilometers with ls(13000, 17000)(x). 3 We also set some preference (weights) on these two vague constraints, say the weight 0.7 to the price constraint and 0.3 to the kilometers constraint, indicating that we give more priority to the price rather than to the car's kilometers. The rules encoding the above conditions are represented in Fig. 5 . Rule (1) in Fig. 5 encodes the preference on the price. Here, ls(10000, 14000)(p) is the function that given a price p returns the degree of truth provided by the left-shoulder function ls(10000, 14000)(p) evaluated on the input p. Similarly, for rule (2) . Rule (3) encodes the combination of the preferences by taking into account the weight given to each preference. The table below reports the instances of Buy(x, p, k) together with their greatest lower bound.
ID PRICE KM s
455 12500 10000 0.56 34 12000 15000 0.50 1812 11000 16000 0.60 .
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The basic inference problem that we are interested in here is the top-k retrieval problem, which is formulated as follows. 
Description Logic Programs
Description Logic Programs [87, 134, 195, 225] are a combination of description logics with logic programming. 4 There is a large body of work on integrating rules and ontologies, which is a key requirement of the layered architecture of the Semantic Web. Significant research efforts focus on hybrid integrations of rules and ontologies, called description logic programs (or dl-programs), which are of the form KB = (L, P ), where L is a description logic knowledge base and P is a finite set of rules involving either queries to L in a loose integration (see especially [71, 72, 68, 69, 70] ) or concepts and roles from L as unary resp. binary predicates in a tight integration (see especially [134, 223, 224, 168, 195, 196] ). Roughly, in the loosely coupled approach, DL atoms may appear in rule bodies and act as queries to an underlying DL system, while in the tightly coupled approach the integration is more involved.
In parallel to these to approaches (loosely coupled vs. tightly coupled) there has been some works on the extension of these approaches towards the management of imperfect information: (i) under probability fall works such as [20, 21, 164, 169, 170] ; (ii) under vagueness fall the works [166, 173, 174, 178, 255, 257, 261, 274] ; while a combination of probability and vagueness in description logic programs can be found in the work (unique so far) [172] .
